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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Liability of Charitable Associations
in Ohio
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether a charitable association should be immune
from tort liability has created a great difference of opinion among Ameri-
can courts. Unlike most problems in the field of torts, each side of -the
question supports its arguments in what may be termed "social justice."
Which view will better serve the needs of a complex modern community
is the heart of the problem. Those who would grant immunity from
tort liability point to the great community benefit flowing from these
associations. They urge that by their very nature charities are entitled to
every legal benefit which the courts can properly give them. It is their
position that the charitable association will be better able to serve the
general community if it is not hampered financially and administratively
by tort claims. The general benefit to the community will far outweigh
any detriment which individuals may suffer from denial of compensation.
On the other hand, those who would deny immunity fervently advo-
cate that the community welfare can only be measured by the well-being
of the individuals who comprise the group.
They point out the dominant and ever increasing role played by
the charity in modern living. This leads to a large number of injuries
stemming from these activities. The financial well being of a great many
of these institutions place them in a position where they can pay for
injuries without seriously impairing their general benevolent activities.
To allow these injuries to be borne solely by the individuals .injured, re-
sults in a festering sore on society which cannot be healed by the general
good that the community derives from these charitable activ tes. In
short, someone must pay and the payment may be more antelligently made
at the point where the injury occurs.
Seldom, -if ever, are the courts faced with a more complex or difficult
value judgment. The question of evaluating which of these views better
serves the general community "good" is a question which cannot be
masked in doctrinal analysis. The decisions of the courts an this area may
be grouped generally into three classifications: (1) those granting complete
immunity; (2) those granting partial immunity; and (3) those denying
immunity.' In recent years there has been a distinct trend toward denial
of immunity. The trend had its genesis in the case of Prestdet and
'For a detailed grouping of states see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 142 (1952).
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Dmctors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.2  It has been said by an
eminent writer that the Georgetown College case demolished the argu-
ments in favor of immunity so completely as to change the course of the
law.3 Since this decision, ten states have abolished the immunity rule.4
Ohio has recently taken a decisive step in this direction. In Avellone v.
St. Johns Hosptta,5 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a corporation
not for profit, which has as its purpose -the maintenance and operation
of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondat suapror, liable -for the
torts of its servants. This decision takes Ohio out of the group of states
which offer partial immunity and places it with those states which deny
immunity. In so doing, the court overruled two previous supreme court
cases6 and parts of another.7 The significance of this decision and Its
far-reaching implications calls for an analysis of .the Ohio law relating to
tort liability of charitable associations.
It will be the purpose of this note to trace the development of this
law in Ohio and to examine future questions raised by the Avellone case
with an eye toward suggesting possible future courses of Ohio law.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OHIO RULE OF PARTIAL IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court of Ohio -first considered the immunity question
in 1911. In Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'ns the decedent's repre-
sentative alleged negligence after a nurse, in the employ of the hospital,
allowed sponges to remain .in the patient at the conclusion of an operation.
The court -held the hospital immune from liability since such associations
were "masters different from others. ' 9 The court said that the hospital
should be exempted from the usual application of respondeat supertor
because public policy encourages this type of charitable association. Thus,
a130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
PRossnn, TORTS 5 109 (2d ed. 1955).
'Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Malloy v. Fong,
37 Cal.2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.2d
40 (Florida 1953); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45
N.W.2d 151 (1950); Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934
(1954); Mississippi Bapnst Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142
(1951); Kardulas v. City of Dover, 99 N.H. 359, 111 A.2d 327 (1955); Rickbeil
v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); Foster v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950); Pierce v.
Yakima Valley Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953)
'165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956)
'Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926); Taylor v.
Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
'Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936).
835 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
Old. at 103, 96 N.E. at 1092.
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the first decision of the court based the granting of immunity from tort
liability on non-application of respondeat supertor, -the rationale being
rooted in policy considerations.10  The rule that a nonprofit hospital
association is not liable for the torts of -its servants under respondeat
sapertor as against the daims of beneficiaries of the chanty, 1 .remained
the law of Ohio until the Avellone case.'2
The next case to come before the court was Taylor v. Flower Deacon-
ess Home and Hosptal.13 The plaintiff charged the hospital with negli-
gence in failing to exercise due and reasonable care in the selection of
the servant who caused the injury. The court held the hospital liable
for its negligence in this respect. The first Taylor case was dearly dis-
tinguished on the ground that the plaintiff there sought to charge the
hospital with negligence through the application of respondeat supertor.
The negligence charged here was directly attributable to the management
of the hospital. The court said,
"States granting tort mmunity to charitable associations have used several differ-
ent legal doctrines to achieve the result. First, there is the "trust fund theory."
Under this theory the funds of a charity are said to be trust property. To allow
this money to be used to settle tort claims would be to divert the trust property
thereby thwarting the charitable intent of the donors. Downs v. Harper Hos-
pital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N.W 42 (1894).
The seconddoctrine utilized in granting immunity is the non-applicauon of
respondeat superior. This theory is used in those states where the rationale for ap-
plying respondeat supertor is based upon the fact that since it is the master who
profits from the business activities, he must also pay when one in his employ wrongs
another. In the charitable association the master does not profit. Hence, respondeat
muperor does not apply. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595
(1895). Another theory used by the courts in granting immunity is the "implied
waiver theory." The court in this instance holds that in accepting the benefits of
the charity, the injured party "waives" any rights he may have had. Cook v. John
N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S.W 874 (1918).
Finally, the courts have used what is referred to as the public policy theory. This
theory is usually combined with one of those previously mentioned. It is a frank
statement of why another doctrine is being used. For instance, in Taylor v. Protes-
tant Hosptai Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E.1089 (1911), the court says that re-
tpondeat superor should not be applied because public policy requires that the court
give every protection possible for the purpose of furthering charitable activities.
' "The fact that a public charitable hospital receives pay from a patient for lodging
and care does not affect its character as a charitable institution, nor its rights or
liabilities as such in relation to such a patient." Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n,
85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911) No distincuon has been drawn between a pay-
ing patient and a nonpaying patient in Ohio. Each is considered a beneficiary of
the charity and the rules of immunity are applicable to each m the same manner.
' The court affirmed the general rule of immunity to nonprofit hospital associations
in Lakesde Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E.2d 857 (1936) The court
also held that there was no valid distinction between cases involving damage to the
person of a patient and damage to his property. Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115
Oluo St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926).
1'104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.. 287 (1922).
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every principle of justice requires that they [management] use care
in the selection of servants who have the oversight of patients'
In this fact situation the denial of immunity was dearly based upon policy
considerations.
In Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius,15 the immunity of the hospital asso-
ciation was further restricted when the court indicated:
We are in accord with the numerous cases which treat charitable msti-
tutioans on the same basis as other corporations and individuals as to lia-
bility for negligence to strangers and invitees who are lawfully upon the
premises of the institution.
Thus, by 1930 the immunity from tort liability of a nonprofit hospital
association had dwindled to those cases wherein the plaintiff was a bene-
ficiary of the charity and was not charging negligent selection or reten-
tion of a servant.
1 6
In the first decision affecting a charitable associaton other than a
hospital, the hospital immunity rule was extended.1 7 The plaintiff charged
a Y.W.CA. with negligence, proceeding under respondeat supetmr. The
legal basis for extension was secondary authority' 8 and citation of foreign
jurisdictions'9 without comment. There was no discussion as to why the
rule should apply generally to all public charitable institutions. This au-
tomatc extension indicates how deep rooted the basic immunity concept
had become.
In a subsequent case,20 the court affirmed a directed verdict for a
defendant church association, stating in the first branch of the syllabus:
A charitable or eleemosynary institution is not liable for tortious injury
except (1) when the injured person is not a beneficiary of the institution,
and (2) when a beneficiary suffers harm as a result of failure on the part
of the authorities of the institution to exercise due care in the selection or
retention of an employee.
"Id. at 73, 74, 135 N.E. at 291.
"123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
"Under the law as it existed at this time, if an orderly in the employ of the hospital
spilled scalding water on a patient and his visitor in the same negligent act, the
visitor could recover from the hospital for his injuries while the patient-beneficiary
would be barred from recovery.
'
7 Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938).
"The court after setting forth the rule applying to hospital associations said, "The
rule pertains not only to hospitals, but is applicable in the case of all public char-
itable instiuions. 2 RESTATBEmNT OF LAw OF TRUSTS, 234, Section 402; 10
AMERicAN JUilSPRuDENcE, 692."
"Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929); Basabo v. Salvation Army,
35 R.I. 22, 85 At. 120 (1912); Bachman v. Y.W.C.A., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W
751 (1922).
'Cullen v. Schnit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.B.2d 146 (1942).
"Id. at 194, 39 N.E.2d at 146 (Syllabus 1).
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This was the first time that the court stated the rule to include all charita-
ble or eleemosynary institutions. The Y.W.C.A. case22 was approved
and once again there was no discussion concerning the wisdom of extend-
ing the hospital rule of immunity to other forms of charitable associa-
tions. 23
The immunity concept, though shaken by exceptions, remained an
integral part of Ohio law as the court approached the Avellone case.24
AVELLONE BREAKTHROUGH
In this case the plaintiff directly attacked the last island of hospital
immunity. The plaintiff charged that he was negligently permitted to
fall from a hospital bed furnished by the defendant. The hospital an-
swered with a general denial and set up as a "separate defense" that it
wa a hospital association not for profit, and thus not liable for the torts
of its employees as against beneficiaries of the charity. The plaintiff
demurred to the "separate defense" on the ground that on its face it was
insufficient in law. The -trial court overruled the demurrer and the plain-
tiff, not wishing to plead further, dismissed the action. Plaintiff's sole
ground of appeal was that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his
demurrer to defendant's "separate defense." The court of appeals af-
firmed the judgment of the trial court 25 and allowance of a motion to
certify brought the case before the Supreme Court. In a 5 to 2 decision,
the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.
Judge Mathias, speaking for the majority, reviews the previous de-
cisions of the court. He recognizes that various legal doctrines26 have
been used to grant immunity to charitable associations. Viewing the
cases from an overall standpoint, .he concludes that though the language
of the court has varied from case to case, the essence of decision has al-
ways been rooted in general public policy considerations. Once having
reached this point, the question of the case and the courts' answer are
frankly stated.
'Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938).
Emphasis is placed upon this factor, for now that the Avellone case has changed
the rule concerning hospital associations to one of liability, the question of extension
to other forms of charitable associations receives renewed importance.
" In the last case to come before the court prior to Avellone, the court announced
that the defendant, Cleveland Museum of Natural History, was liable for injuries
resulting from the negligent selection and retention of a servant. Newman v. Cleve-
land Museum of Natural History, 143 Ohio St. 369, 55 N.E.2d 575 (1944). This
extended to charities other than hospitals the rule set forth in Taylor v. Flower Dea-
coness Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61,. 135 N.E. 287 ('1922)




The determination involves simply the balancing of two "rights."'
On the one hand, there is the well recognized right of nonprofit hospitals
to any benefit and assistance which society and the law can justly allow
them -a right which they command by their very nature; and on the
other hand we see the right of the individual injured by the negligence of a
servant to look for recompense to the master of such servant, under respon-
deat superior.
Up to this point in the development of the law, this court has apparently
felt that the benefit to society as a whole, gained by granting immunity;
weighed the former right in favor of the latter, and this was on the ground
that such masters were "different from others," and that immunizing them
was "a valuable aid in securing the ends of justice."
In our opinion this conclusion is no longer justified!'
The court then notes the increased social legislation in Ohio which
provides for payment of hospital bills for statutory beneficiaries.28 Judge
Mathias then states that, according to survey, one half of the gross charges
incurred by patients in American hospitals in 1955 was paid for through
hospitalization insurance.2 9 Hospital associations are generally large well
run organizations and,
in many instances, the hospital is so "businesslike" in its monetary re-
quirements for entrance and in its collections of accounts that a shadow is
thrown upon the word, "charity."'
From all of these factors the court concludes that a nonprofit hospital
association has a much broader basis of payment for services rendered
than did such an organization 50 years ago.3 '
Then follows an extremely anteresting discussion concerning the
availability of liability insurance. The court points out that this form of
organization can carry liability insurance. The court after stating this
fact goes on to say that its discussion in this area,
does not concern the imposition of liability where none theretofore
existed. It concerns, rather, the public policy which has heretofore held
institutions such as the defendant immune as to beneficiaries, under a lia-
bility which is pre-existent under the ordinary rule of respondeat superor.
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 473, 135 N.E.2d 410, 414
(1956).
2nOHIO REV. CODE § 5105.07 (aid for the aged); OIO REV. CODE 5 5107.10
(aid for dependent children); OHIo REV. CODE §5 4515.03-.11 (reimbursement
to hospitals for the care of indigents injured by motor vehicles); OHio REv. CODE
§5 5113.01, 5113.03, 5113.04 (poor relief); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 5103.12-.13
(care for crippled children).
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 474, 135 N.E.2d 410, 414
(1956).
nId. at 474, 135 N.E.2d at 415. It is interesting to note that prior to the institu-
non of this action, Avelione was sued by St. John's Hospital to recover for services
rendered during the period of his confinement.
'The rule of immunity was first announced in Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n,
85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911), just 45 years prior to the Avellone case.
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We emphatically state that we are not imposing a liability heretofore non-
existent merely because it may be indeminified by insurance.'
This statement tends to turn an otherwise frank opinion by the court, with
respect to general policy considerations, into a bit of "legal mumbo
jumbo." Whether the liability insurance discussion is utilized to eliminate
an "exception" to a "general rule" of liability, or to impose liability
where -none existed before is of little consequence. Whether immunity
was an "exception" or a "general rule" is a mere verbal quibble. The
fallacy of the distinction is brought to light more fully when it is observed
that the "ordinary rule of respondeat saperior" -is itself an "exception"
to the general principle that one should not have to pay for the wrongs of
others. It seems clear that the availability of liability insurance played at
least some part in this court's decision to hold charitable hospitals liable
for torts in an area where they were theretofore not liable.
Judge Mathias continues that if the losses suffered an -these cases are
not absorbed by the hospital under normal rules of respondeat superor,
chances are high that the plaintiff or members of his family will become
burdens upon society to be cared for by other nonprofit charitable asso-
ciations.
From the foregoing factors, the court concluded that:
Whatever the reason for the public policy that gave rise to the rule of
immunity, public policy today, examined in the light of present day condi-
tions, will not support such a rule."
It is important to emphasize that Avellone is decided upon the plead-
ings. All that is "legally certain" is that nonprofit hospital associations
are now liable for torts of their servants according to the rules of re-
spondeat supertor The tenor of the opinion, however, indicates that the
decision may well have far reaching effects.
As is usually the case, a decision announcing a new -ule of law pre-
sents perplexing questions left unanswered by the opinion. The Avellone
case is no exception.
EXTENSION OF AVELLONE RULE TO
OTHER CHARITABLE ASSOCIATONS
The most obvious question arising from the Avellone case is whether
the rule of total liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior applies
to charitable associations other than nonprofit hospitals. In drafting the
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 475, 135 N.E.2d 410, 415
(1956).
"id. at 476, 135 N.E.2d at 416. Judge Mathias quoted liberally from the opinion




Avellone syllabus, the court specifically limits the holding to "A corpora-
tion not for profit, which has as its purpose the maintenance and opera-
tion of a hospital ,,34 Furthermore, the opinion gives no indication
that the rule announced is to be extended to any other form of charitable
institution. The court when "weighing' policy considerations places on
the scales factors which could not be considered if the defendant were
a small church association - s.e., "hospitalization -nsurance" - "well
run business associations" - "ready availability of liability insurance."
This indicates that the new rule does not necessarily apply to charities
other than non-profit hospital associations.
On the other hand, the dissentO5 in Avellone insists that the rule must
be applied generally to all forms of charitable associations. As a basis
for this condusion, the dissenting judges cite the general application of
the immunity rule as set forth in Waddell v. Y.W.C.A. 3 6 and that the
rule " cannot logically be circumscribed to be applicable to hospitals
alone." 7 (Emphasis supplied) The Waddell case, as has been previously
pointed out, extended the rule of immaunty to defendants other than hos-
pital associations on the basis of secondary authority without any discus-
sion of the advisability of such a move. Further, a case granting im-
munity is not necessarily authority for withdrawing that immunity. The
W'addell case is therefore not conclusive legal authority for the dissent's
position that there must be a single rule governing all eleemosynary
institutions.
As to the dissenting view that the rule cannot "logically" be circum-
scribed to hospitals alone, it is the writer's belief that the court would be
inconsistent if it fails to "re-weig" the policy considerations when a case
involving a different form of eleemosynary institution arises. The in-
terest to be weighed in the case of the liability of a children's fresh air
camp, for example, may prove far different from those interests which
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
'Two court of appeals judges, both sitting by designation pursuant to Artcle IV,
Secton 2 of the Oho Consttuton, dissented. The dissent would have contnued
the present immunity on the grounds that, 1) elimination of immunity cannot logi-
cally be circumscribed to hospitals alone but must be extended to all eleemosynary
institutions -this result being unwise; 2) Mr. Justice Rutledges opinion in the
Georgetown College case did not abolish arguments in favor of immunity for he
failed to convince 3 members of his own court; and 3) the court should not juggle
the public policy concept so readily - such change should be effectuated by the
legislature. The dissent is not persuasive in the sense that it throws up "road blocks"
against change without discussing the real issue of the case- that of spreading the
loss.
M133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E.2d 140 (1938).
Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 479, 135 N.E.2d 410, 418
(1956).
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are considered in the case of "a -large well run corporation,"38 as are most
nonprofit hospitals today. The activities of the typical fresh air camp
are made possible only through direct charitable contributions by the
public. The broader base of payment for services rendered"8 9 which the
court considered as an important factor in Avellone would not be a con-
sideration if the defendant were a fresh air camp. The same statement
may be made of a small church association. If "logic" mans that a rule
should not be extended unless the vital considerations used in arriving at
the rule remain the same, then "logic" would indicate that the Avellone
rule should not be extended to areas where the policy considerations are
different.
The shortcomings in this approach are apparent. It would require
each form of charitable association to be considered individually in deter-
mining the immunity or liability question. In a modern community
where -there are 100 or more different charitable associations,40 the ad-
ministration of the law would become extremely complicated. Lawyers,
lower court judges and charity officials would face a long and difficult
period of uncertainty. This situation would lead to much litigation, fur-
ther burdening our already overcrowded dockets. The opportunity for
settlement would be greatly diminished, in that each form of charitable
association may seek appellate review so that the court may consider its
particular policy considerations. These are problems which necessarily
follow a decision which "balances the interests," and which is restricted to
the factual situation therein presented. This, of course, tends to narrowly
restrict the application of .the rule derived therefrom. Though this type
of decision brings about difficult problems of administration in the law,
it is submitted that when society is complex it may reasonably follow that
the law is of necessity complex.
The State of Washington has recognized that different forms of
eleemosynary institutions require different rules. In 1953 the Supreme
Court in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n,41 held the
defendant nonprofit hospital responsible for the torts of its servants.
Two years later in Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church,42 the
court specifically limited the rule of liability announced in the Pierce case
to situations where the plaintiff was a paying patient of a nonprofit hos-
'Id. at 474, 135 N.E.2d at 415.
bd.
"The Welfare Federation of Cleveland lists 100 or more financially participating
charities. Avellone v. St. John s Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 479, 135 N.E.2d 410
418 (1956)
" 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953)
-47 Wash.2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955)
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pital association. In the Lyon case a child was injured through the negli-
gent operation of a school bus while being transported to Sunday school.
The Washington court summarily distinguished a -religious benevolent
society from a hospital association. Whether the Ohio courts will draw
such a distinction remains to be seen.
APPLICATION OF RSPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Judge Mathias raises in Avellone the question of future application of
respondent superior:
We, thus, conclude that a corporation not for profit, which has as its
purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine
respondeat superior (and the various rules and exceptions applicable there-
to), liable for the torts of its servants, and leave for future determination
the application of this doctrine to the facts of the instant cases as may be
proved on trial. For instance, we are not deciding that persons working in
a hospital, such as doctors and nurses, under arcumstances where the
hospital has no authority or right of control over them, can bind the hos-
pital by their negligent actions.'
There are at least three possible approaches in solving this question.
First, there as the traditional view that a doctor or nurse is too highly
skilled and responsible to be classified as a servant under the doctrine.
This theory is still the law of England44 but a comparatively recent case
indicates that change is imminen 5  A few American jurisdictions fol-
low this course by classifying professional employees of a hospital as
"independent contractors."46  This embraces the traditional approach of
respondeat superior. If the employer has no control over the employee
he shall not be made to -respond for his employee's negligence. It is
thought that the hospital-employer, in hiring professional services, can-
not have that measure of control over the professional activities of its
employees as to render it liable under the doctrine.
Were the Ohio court to adopt this view, there could be no recovery
in the Aveflone situation. It may be assumed that most injuries in a
hospital would -result from the activities of "professional help." There-
fore, the acceptance of this view of respondeat superior would tend to
immunize the hospital to essentially the same extent as prior to Avellone.
The ground for granting such immunity would merely shift from the
'Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 477, 135 N.E.2d 410, 417
(1956).
" Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, (1909) 2 K.B. 820 (C.A.)
'Gold v. Essex County Council, (1942) 2 All. E.R. 237 (C.A.).
"Norwood Hospital v. Brown, 219 Ala. 445, 122 So. 411 (1929); Runyan v.
Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W 397 (1921); Iterman v. Baker, 214 Ind. 308,
15 N.E.2d 365 (1938).
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charity theory to the doctrinal basis of respondeat sapenor. The Avellone
case professes to spread the -loss of anjury where it may best be met. It
can reasonably be assumed that the court will not negate this desired
result.
The second approach -to the application of respondeat saperor finds
no valid reason for exempting a hospital or other organiation from
liability for the negligence of a professional employee. The majority
of American jurisdictions follow this view. 47 Although these cases gen-
erally involved profit-making corporations, they are nevertheless authority
in this area for Avellone holds that nonprofit masters are no longer
"masters different than others. '48 The rationale behind this view does not
look upon respondea superior as a concept to be rationally and logically
applied in all types of cases. It is a device whereby injuries may be
compensated for by one who is in the best position to absorb the cost.
To exclude hospitals from liability on the basis that their employees are
highly trained and skillful technicians, would create a large area wherein
the doctrine would be inoperable. This result would require many an-
lured persons to suffer the loss of injury alone. The essential question
under the modern view- of respondeat supertor is the fact of employment.
The general problems of "scope of employmene are also applicable under
this approach. Since the Ohio court was outwardly interested in "spread-
ing the loss" in Avellone it would be consistent in adopting the view
which places little importance upon the question of "control."
The 'final approach to be discussed is that followed by the New York
courts. 49 It -is somewhat of a "hybrid" concept. The question of whether
the hospital is liable depends upon whether the activity from which the
injury flowed was "professional" or "administrative." If it was "profes-
'Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947); Woodburn
v. Standard Forgings Corp., 112 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1940); Giust v. C. H. Weston
Co., 165 Ore. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941); Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry,
173 Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939); Treptan v. Behrens Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20
N.W.2d 108 (1945); Noren v. American School of Osteopathy, 298 S.W 1061
(Mo. App. 1927).
'Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 103, 96 N.E. 1089, 1092
(1911).
"Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940). In
discussing the New York rule, it is interesting to note that when Judge Mathias
raised the problem of respondeat superr in Avellone, he cited the case of Schloen-
dorf v. Society of New York Hospstal, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). The
case cited does not present the modern New York approach to the problem, how-
ever. The Schloendorif case hets forth the proposition that the doctrine of respondeat
superior should never be applied to professional employees of a hospital association.
It is the writer's opinion that the case was cited for the purpose of illustrating the
problems presented, rather than as an indication that the Ohio court will follow the
holding when the question comes before the court.
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sional" no liability results. If "administrative' - liability. At first
blush the rule seems logical However, exammanon of the cases reveals
some peculiar results. The fact of employment and the duties for which
the person is employed are unimportant. An orderly may be rendering
a "professional" service if he is doing what a nurse would normally do."0
If the New York rule were carried to its logical extremity, a non-employee
of the hospital, such as a visiting doctor, could render the hospital liable
if he were performing an administrative function. Conversely, the hos-
pital could be held not responsible for the acts of an employee hired to
perform the most menial of tasks, if it be determined that the specific
act causing the injury was "professional" in nature. Lower court cases
are in a state of turmoil in New York. The validity of the administra-
tive-professional distinction may tbe questioned because of numerous
technical exceptions which have been made'
CONCLUSION
The Ohio court in the Avellone case faced the problem of charitable
immunity unflinchingly. The social issues were presented and thoroughly
discussed. There was no resort to doctrinal analysis for the purpose of
masking what -the judges were really doing. The court made a social
prediction to -the effect that the needs of -the modern community will be
better served if hospital associations are required to pay for .the torts of
their servants on the same basis as noncharitable associations. To agree
or disagree with this prediction is the prerogative of all who recogize the
problem presented.
In a strict legal sense the Avellone case -has said merely that a "special
defense" setting forth the charitable nature of a hospital association is now
subject to demurrer. However, the considerations utilized in the opinion
cannot be limited to the case. They are cogent Tealities of life in a
modern community, and must be brought into focus at any time the ques-
tion of charitable immunity comes before the court.
Ohio is on the threshold of shaping a new area of -law. When the
future is unknown, extreme care must be taken to avoid the pitfalls. Since
Avellone was determined on the pleadings, the full impact of the decision
will not be known until it is determined (1) whether the rule announced
will apply generally to all charitable associations and; (2) which view
will be followed in the application of respondeat superr. A blind appli-
canon of the rule to include all eleemosynary institutions could result in
"Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
" For an excellent discussion and a review of the New York cases, see Note, 25
N.Y.U. L. REv. 612 (1950).
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